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Provocation - Pushing the Reasonable Man too far? 
Sarah Oliver, LL.B (Hons.), Edin., Lecturer in Law, School of Public Admin. and Law, Robert Gordon 
University. 
 
 Almost every aspect of the partial defence of provocation has caused 
considerable debate over the years. Areas of difficulty range from the question of 
when the issue should be left to the jury, to the relevance of the defence to battered 
women who kill. The issue for consideration here will be the ‘reasonable’ or ‘ordinary 
man’ and the characteristics imputed to him in the light of the accused’s own 
character. R. v. Smith1 reaffirms the Court of Appeal’s view that the accused’s 
characteristics should be included at all levels of the test. Attitudes to this differ 
considerably. On the one hand, some argue that the doctrine weakens the legal 
requirement of self-control and is therefore only acceptable where the accused has 
been pushed to extremes. This is ensured by maintaining a highly objective approach 
and narrow interpretation of the ‘reasonable man’. On the other hand, it is argued that, 
in the interests of attaining justice, characteristics of the accused should be imputed to 
the reasonable man in order to acknowledge that some people will find conduct more 
provoking than others, and that some individuals may have a lower threshold of self-
restraint which should be taken into account. This article considers the merits of these 
two approaches by analysing recent English case law and contrasting this with 
Australian developments. 
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English Law 
 The reasonable man did not emerge here until the late nineteenth century, and 
for almost a hundred years judges directed juries on the characteristics attributable to 
him. The approach was to look at the provocative effect of the conduct on the 
ordinary person, even where the accused suffered from some condition which made 
him react differently2. Thus the approach taken was objective - if the accused had 
killed his victim under provocation, he would only establish the defence if the 
reasonable man would have been so provoked. This reasonable man bore none of the 
personal characteristics of the accused. 
 
 However, this approach, exemplified in Bedder v. D.P.P.3, was reversed by 
the Homicide Act 1957 section 3, under which the judge was no longer entitled to 
dictate the characteristics of that reasonable man to the jury. The effect of this section 
is shown in D.P.P. v. Camplin4 where a 15 year old boy who had been raped and then 
taunted by the deceased, was judged by the effect such provocation would have had 
on a reasonable boy. In rejecting the trial judge’s opinion, the Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords affirmed that section 3 overruled Bedder and accepted that the age of 
the accused was a characteristic which should be imputed to the reasonable man. Lord 
Diplock classified the reasonable man as someone of either sex “...not exceptionally 
excitable or pugnacious”, which has remained the law, but went on to mitigate the test 
by allowing age to be included5. His age was not an individual peculiarity or 
abnormality, but merely a phase through which everyone passes. Thus the reasonable 
man would be endowed with the same age and sex as the accused, along with any 
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other relevant characteristics in order to assess more subjectively the gravity of the 
provocation offered to the accused. However, the degree of self-control expected of 
him would reflect only the accused’s age and sex, thus remaining as objective as 
possible6. 
 
 This immediately raised the problem of which characteristics are classified as 
‘relevant’ for the subjective arm of the test, and there has also been a steady increase 
in the attributes imputed to the reasonable man under the objective test. Indeed, in 
allowing age and sex to be used for the appropriate level of self-control, it appears 
that Lord Diplock opened the floodgates to further characteristics. In R. v. Morhall7 a 
drug addict was persistently taunted about his addiction to glue. In his trial for 
murder, he unsuccessfully raised the issue of provocation and appealed. It was held in 
the Court of Appeal that the reasonable man could not be given the accused’s 
characteristic of addiction because the reasonable man was not an addict. However in 
the House of Lords this was rejected because Morhall’s addiction should be taken into 
account if the provocation had been targeted at that addiction. Thus, if Morhall had 
been provoked by some other statement, the fact that he was also a glue-sniffer would 
have been discounted, but since he was provoked by being nagged about his 
addiction, his response was to be assessed by reference to a reasonable man with the 
same addiction. By extension this would presumably also apply to any other form of 
addiction. 
 
 Leaving aside those cases where an individual’s characteristics are the subject 
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of the provocation, it follows from cases such as Luc Thiet Thuan v. R8 that English 
law looks at such characteristics for two purposes. The first is to accurately assess the 
gravity of the provocation. Here, the subjective characteristics of the accused will be 
given to the reasonable man so that they can be taken into account in determining the 
seriousness of the provocative conduct. Secondly, the accused must be shown to have 
exercised an appropriate level of self-control and for this test, those individual 
peculiarities are ignored, leading to an objective assessment. In Luc Thiet Thuan, the 
accused was suffering from brain damage which impaired control of his impulses. 
The Court of Appeal felt that such individual characteristics were not relevant to the 
reasonable person unless the provocation was directed at that characteristic (his 
mental abnormality). This reasoning was also upheld by the majority in the Privy 
Council, which result may well have been influenced by the mix of judges from 
different jurisdictions who heard the case, as some of them came from systems which 
adopt a fairly narrow approach to the level of self-control required.. It was felt that the 
appropriate plea was diminished responsibility, as a mental abnormality was not a 
relevant characteristic for the objective limb of the test. Thus the test for this aspect of 
provocation seemed at this stage to have moved from a highly objective, narrow 
formulation, to a two-fold test, the first part of which injects an element of 
subjectivity whilst the second retains a suitable degree of objectivity.  
 
However, a recent English case casts some doubt on the exclusion of 
individual characteristics from the second limb. In R. v. Smith9 the question was 
whether the accused’s severe depression was a relevant characteristic to impute to the 
reasonable man. It was held that it was relevant to an assessment of the gravity of the 
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provocation aimed at the accused - someone who is severely depressed would 
probably view conduct as more provocative than someone not so afflicted. However, 
it was also relevant to the second limb - the level of self-control to be expected of 
Smith. For these purposes, the court held that his severe depression should be taken 
into account when assessing what the reasonable man’s reaction would have been to 
that level of provocation. This involves including a mental abnormality within the 
objective limb of the test, contrary to Luc Thiet Thuan and moves the law in this area 
on to a much more subjective plane. There was no suggestion that the provocative 
conduct was aimed specifically at his depression. Indeed the prosecution argued that 
depression should be admitted as a relevant characteristic for the purposes of 
determining the gravity, but should be excluded from the assessment of the level of 
self-control required. This follows what had, until then, been accepted.  
 
However, the court decided not to follow the approach from Luc Thiet Thuan 
and instead followed Lord Steyn’s dissenting judgement in that case which relied 
heavily on Lord Simon in Camplin. The effect of the latter judgement was to query 
the nature of the reasonable man as used to set the required level of self-control. Lord 
Simon felt that the reasonable man was an appropriate measure, but not in the guise of 
“some hypothetical being from whom all mental and physical attributes (except 
perhaps sex) have been abstracted.”10 Lord Steyn in Luc Thiet Thuan had interpreted 
this passage as meaning that age (as per Camplin) could not be the only relevant 
factor in determining the objective limb of the test, and indeed that all the 
characteristics of the accused should be considered. In Smith, Lord Steyn’s speech in 
Luc Thiet Thuan is quoted in some detail. When referring to Lord Simon’s statement 
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quoted above, Lord Steyn said that it was 
 
…inconsistent with any intention to treat youthful immaturity as the 
only mental characteristic relevant to the objective requirement. 
Indeed later in his judgement Lord Simon made it clear that “the 
entire factual situation, which includes the characteristics of the 
accused, must be considered”.11 
 
 Thus, applying this approach in Smith, the appellant’s submissions were 
accepted. Submissions by the prosecution were along Camplin lines (that his 
depression was relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the provocation, but not to 
the level of self-control required), but the Court of Appeal disregarded them for two 
reasons. Firstly, they felt that they were not bound Luc Thiet Thuan  as it was a Privy 
Council decision. Instead they decided to adopt reasoning from Lord Steyn’s 
dissenting judgement in Luc Thiet Thuan, itself relying partly on Lord Simon’s 
judgement in Camplin. Lord Simon’s remarks in particular make it clear that he felt 
other characteristics of the accused, beyond age and sex, should be considered in 
determining the required level of self-control. Secondly, the court in Smith explicitly 
stated that they were bound by their previous decisions in this area. One of these cases 
is not strictly in point with Smith; R. v. Humphreys12 involved the inclusion of 
attention seeking by wrist-slashing as a characteristic of the reasonable man. The 
provocation offered to Humphreys related directly to that characteristic – she was 
taunted with having not made a good job of it – and it is not disputed that, where the 
provocation is aimed precisely at that subjective characteristic of the accused, it 
should be included under both limbs of the test13. Another characteristic sought to be 
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included was immaturity which is admissible as it follows directly from Camplin. The 
final characteristic raised was her explosive nature which was correctly rejected 
following the Camplin exclusion14. Reference was also made to R. v. Ahluwalia15 and 
R. v. Thornton (No. 2)16, both relating to battered women. It is arguable that to allow 
the partial defence in these cases requires sufficient derogation from the usual 
principles governing provocation that they should not be relied upon outside their 
particular sphere. However, regardless of the status of these previous cases, it is clear 
that the Court of Appeal feels bound by precedent to allow other factors beyond age 
and sex to be imputed to the reasonable man for the purposes of self-control. It was 
acknowledged in R. v. Campbell17 that unless and until such decisions were 
overruled, the Court of Appeal had no choice but to follow them. 
 
 In summary, English law now requires that the reasonable man should have all 
the mental and physical characteristics of the accused in relation to the gravity of the 
provocation. Furthermore, all such characteristics are relevant to the level of self-
control required, with the time-honoured exception of irascibility. The latter 
substantially weakens the self-control element and thereby the objectivity of the 
partial defence of provocation. Critics would say that this allows the accused to 
escape conviction for murder all the more easily since, having measured the gravity of 
the provocation through his eyes, the self-control required of him would only be that 
of the reasonable man who had all the accused’s peculiar characteristics except 
irascibility. 
 
                                                          
14 supra, p2. 
15 [1992] 4 All ER 889. 
16 [1996] 2 All ER 1023. 
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Australian law 
 Australian courts have been characteristically thorough in their consideration 
of this issue, and it is interesting to note that their approach is less liberal than that 
suggested by Smith. In Stingel v. The Queen18, what was required was conduct of a 
nature that would deprive the ordinary person of self-control. It was felt necessary in 
all cases of provocation to determine first the gravity of the provoking conduct and 
that this could only be achieved by a subjective assessment which took into account 
all relevant characteristics of the accused. Further it was stated that, potentially, all 
the accused’s characteristics could be included if relevant to the issue19. Examples 
given included the age, sex, race, physical features, personal relationships and 
attributes, and past history of the accused. However, the next stage identified by the 
court was to determine whether that level of provocation would have made the 
ordinary person lose self-control. At this stage, personal characteristics of the accused 
should be ignored, except his age as a concession to immaturity. It seems well-
established that it is unfair to expect a young person to exercise the self-control of an 
adult, and, further, that age cannot be characterised as something personal to the 
accused as it is common to everyone. 
  
 Several years later, the same questions were discussed in Masciantonio v. The 
Queen20 following the reasoning in Stingel. Again it was felt that the first step was to 
assess the gravity of the provocation by reference to all relevant characteristics of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
17 [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 199. 
18 (1990) 171 CLR 312. Also at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/do/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/high_ct/171clr312.html 
All page references to this case refer to pages of the internet edition. 
19 ibid., p7. 
20 (1995) 183 CLR 58. Also at  
http://www.austlii.edu.au/do/disp.pl/au/cases/cth/high_ct/183clr58.html 
All page references to this case refer to pages of the internet edition. 
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accused21. This acknowledges that factors such as age, race, physical features and 
past history can make an otherwise relatively innocuous statement highly 
inflammatory and also emphasises the need to contextualise such enquiries in order to 
give them meaning. To assess the gravity of the conduct, any list given of relevant 
characteristics was not felt to be exhaustive as any circumstance which explained the 
accused’s conduct should be taken into account. 
 
 McHugh J.’s judgement points to the strange juxtaposition whereby all 
relevant characteristics are included for the first part of the test, but substantially 
excluded for the second. He states that the ‘ordinary person’ test would be 
meaningless if all characteristics were included in this second limb as well as in the 
first, since the idea of an objective test is to provide one standard which everyone has 
to meet22. Whilst he accepted the need to include personal characteristics in the 
assessment of the gravity of provocation, he refused to include these characteristics in 
the second limb relating to the required level of self-control, as to do so would be to 
undermine the objectivity of the test completely. McHugh felt that the objective 
standard was too well-entrenched in the common law for a judge to be able to remove 
it. However, he did go on to say that some characteristics could be included in the 
objective ‘ordinary person’ test without compromising that objectivity, instancing 
ethnicity and cultural background, and age.  
 
 These clearly form a group of general characteristics, as opposed to those 
peculiarly attributable to the accused. Thus, whereas to assess gravity, all 
characteristics are admissible, to assess the required level of self-control, only the 
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above limited group are used. McHugh felt that, given the multi-cultural state of 
Australian society, it would be unjust and discriminatory to assess minority groups 
under criteria referable only to the majority23. He recognises that this could be said to 
establish a different standard for each social group, but feels that this is an inevitable 
consequence of equal treatment before the law. Thus, this case adds to the doctrine 
established in Stingel, where ethnicity was not an issue, in that ethnic and cultural 
background should now be added to age as relevant characteristics for the ordinary 
person when determining the level of self-control required of the accused. 
 
The future of the reasonable man test 
 It seems sensible to identify two separate aspects to the rule that the 
provocation must be such as would make the reasonable man lose self-control. The 
first step in any decision must be to measure the level or gravity of that provocation. 
It further seems sensible to assess the gravity subjectively. The overall tenor of the 
test is objective – the law requires a certain degree of self-control from everyone – but 
this should not be followed too slavishly so as to exclude all subjective assessments. 
To measure the seriousness of the provoking conduct requires acknowledgement of 
characteristics peculiar to the accused, as these will have an effect on the measure of 
that provocation. If the accused has certain characteristics which render the conduct 
more provoking than would be expected, there seems little point in artificially 
ignoring this. It is better to acknowledge it, measure the level of provocation 
accordingly, and then ask whether, objectively, the reasonable man faced with that 
increased level of provocation would have responded in the same manner as the 
accused. This approach acknowledges the reality of the accused’s situation (that he 
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felt the sting of the provocation more keenly) but still requires him to respond to that 
in a way deemed to be socially acceptable (in a way which mirrors the reasonable 
man’s response). Admittedly, the accused is not required to meet an unmodified form 
of the reasonable man test, since some of his characteristics are imputed when 
assessing the acceptable level of response, but these are, broadly speaking, limited to 
age and sex, with the addition of culture and ethnicity in Australia. It is widely 
accepted that factors such as age are not peculiar to the accused and should be 
relevant to the level of self-control required of him. However, if the test is to remain 
fairly objective, cultural and ethnic factors should perhaps be acknowledged as 
relatively indeterminate and therefore unsuitable for inclusion. Although they are not 
peculiar to the individual, they are also not, unlike being of a particular age and 
gender, universal. 
 
 Whatever the status of these cultural and ethnic factors, it seems clear that all 
characteristics of the accused should not be included when assessing whether the 
reasonable man would have responded in such a way to a given level of provocation. 
While all relevant characteristics should be taken into account to determine the 
gravity of the provocation, to allow them in the second limb of the test removes any 
real requirement of self-control. The accused would simply show that he had reacted 
immediately to conduct which he saw as extremely provoking for some personal 
reason. He would then have no real difficulty in showing that a reasonable man with 
that very personal characteristic would have responded in the same way. In essence 
then, the doctrine had reached a mature and developed position in England with cases 
such as Luc Thiet Thuan, and likewise in Australia. The inclusion of cultural and 
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ethnic factors in that jurisdiction seems perhaps unwarranted if the aim is to retain 
objectivity, but this appears to reflect their particular situation and political concern to 
acknowledge their level of multi-culturalism. 
 
However, England appears to have taken a step too far in R. v. Smith where 
they impute all the accused’s personal characteristics, except irascibility, to the 
reasonable man for both limbs of the test. It is worth noting, however, that the Court 
of Appeal granted leave for the case to proceed to the House of Lords, and it will be 
interesting to see what line they take. It is submitted that objectivity should be 
preserved in this limb of the test, along the lines used previously in England, and 
consistently in Australia. The dual test allows subjective factors to determine the 
gravity of the provocation, but still insists that certain standards of self-control are 
met, with very limited concessions to universal characteristics which affect ability to 
achieve such a standard. Any extension to this test subjectivises the concept of the 
reasonable man too much. 
